ABSTRACT -This paper examines the determinants of the €-$ exchange rate, using the news approach to exchange rate modeling and some behavioral finance categories in the interpretation of its dynamics. A twice-daily frequency estimation was chosen, dividing the global trading day into an European Time Zone, ETZ (including also Asian trading), and an American Time Zone, ATZ. A new typology of news variables, unscheduled news, was employed, together with the traditional scheduled macroeconomic news. These former news, consisting of policy statements, market events, market beliefs, terror-related events turned out to be the main determinants of €-$ movements. Coefficient stability tests suggested to divide our 1999-2004 sample into three sub-periods roughly corresponding to the three phases of recent Euro history. The main finding of our analysis is the rejection of the semi-strong EMH once we move from the estimation over the entire sample to the three sub-periods. Here we find many lagged news variables to be significant, contrary to what EMH posits. The distribution of lagged news across time zones (ETZ and ATZ) and among the three sub-periods, indicates a substantial heterogeneity in the way news are decoded by market participants in the two trading zones and that exchange rates in ATZ react almost exclusively to American news, indicating that this zone influences the rest of the world but it is not affected by it. Scheduled news play a much bigger role in ATZ than in ETZ, especially the creation of new jobs in the US (the Non-farm Payroll). Exchange rate dynamics in ETZ is determined mostly by unscheduled news.
More general, insights from many other psychological theories have been applied to understand phenomena in financial market. Extensive psychological research has documented that people tend to be overconfident in their judgments; they value the comfort of imitating each other (herd behavior), they may be far more frightened of losses than inspired by potential gains (the loss function would not be symmetric), they have problems of self-control.
If the calculating, emotionless, unboundedly rational Homo Oeconomicus displays human limitations and complications, markets can show behavior conflicting with the EMH theory. In particular, as pointed out by SHILLER(2000) , in foreseeing the bursting of America's share-price bubble, people can pay for shares much more than any other rational investor would, enabling returns to have patterns that differ from the pure «random walk» path.
An important reason for success of the news approach is the possibility of integrating the explanation of foreign exchange returns within the standard paradigm of asset price formation, the EMH. According to it, contemporaneous information -on fundamentals and news on fundamentals -should be sufficient to determine unequivocally the returns. In this paper we will demonstrate empirically (in Section 4) that forex returns determination needs much more than contemporaneous macroeconomic news, as we show that also lagged news of all kinds contain significant information to explain returns overtime.
In this paper we estimate several news equations of the type specified below: This equation shows the relationship between the variation of the exchange rate, S, in t+1 and a set of determinants: "s" fundamental determinants Y t+1, the difference between "m" scheduled news on the main macroeconomic indicators Z t+1 and their expected values, "n" unscheduled news U t+1 . α, θ, β and γ are parameters to be estimated and ε t+1 is the normally distributed error with zero mean and constant variance.
The time index 10 in (1.1) refers to a twice-daily frequency, observing the €-$ exchange rates at two different times in the 24-hour Global Trading Day (GTD) 11 at 4PM EST (10PM, CET) and at 8:15AM EST (2:15PM, CET) when the European Central bank (ECB) evaluates the Euro exchange rate versus the major world currencies. We thus estimate in the empirical section of this paper two different exchange rate equations: one of them is referred to the European Time Zone (ETZ ) going from the closing of the US markets the previous calendar day at 4PM EST (10PM, CET) to 8:15AM (2:15PM, CET); the other equation is referred to the American Time Zone (ATZ) going from 8:15AM to 4:PM, EST.
Both scheduled and unscheduled news occur during ETZ or ATZ. Scheduled news in ETZ are typically in the wires between 7 and 10AM, CET. ATZ news are mostly concentrated at 8:30AM, influenced by the context that accompanies the decision problems. Part of this framing is generated by the people themselves, as when they adopt some mental accounting of their financial circumstances, such as "representative heuristics" (when they infer the probability of a model from data -generally the most recent data -rather than using the appropriate statistical probability) or conservatism (when they persevere in their past beliefs long after they should have abandoned them). 10 The above formulation is time-invariant and could have been written with reference to time t and not t+1. 11 It goes, in our analysis from the closing of US financial markets on the East Coast at 4PM EST (Eastern Standard Time, equivalent to 10PM, Central European Time, CET) in day t to the same time twenty four hours later.
EST
12 , but something is also released later. Unscheduled news can happen anytime during ETZ and ATZ but typically long before the time the corresponding exchange rate is sampled. Fundamentals have a precise timing within the above time zones. A discussion on the scheduled and unscheduled news used in this paper is in Section 2.
This rather unusual timing convention -empirically quite robust -has the main advantage of allowing a sharper measurement of the news impact over the €-$ rate at a relatively low frequency. Our impact is measured with respect to the exchange rate at the end of our two time zones (ETZ and ATZ) . With respect to a larger set of scheduled news, which were found to be significant at higher frequency in the papers recalled in footnotes 4 and 6, just a few show a significant effect at the end of our time period in the equations estimated below. Unscheduled news, on the other hand, are much more significant and exert a powerful influence even on unconditional returns 13 .
According to the news approach and the EMH, all that is needed to explain an exchange rate return is information on α, θ, β. We will show in this paper that all over and under reactions, all forms of persistence in overshooting values of €-$ all debated anomalies in forex dynamics depend on unscheduled news -to estimate γ -and on lags in all news typologies (scheduled and unscheduled). We thus offer in one shot (a) an important integration to the news approach (you need unscheduled news to understand exchange rate swings, the €-$ here), (b) a rejection of EMH price formation in the foreign exchange market. This is done in the econometric Section 4.
A complete assessment of the importance of unscheduled news needs historical perspective. Important episodes of overshooting and undershooting frequently need a full understanding of the market sentiment prevailing at the time they occur. Polarization 14 -frequently generated by all types of news -is an effect and a cause of wild swings in exchange rates. In order to understand it, econometrics is not enough. A detailed market chronicle is needed to spot the formation and changes of market sentiment. This is done in Section 3.
2.) News and the €-$ Exchange Rate

2.1) News
The gathering and analysis of the latest piece of available information (on the publication of the main macroeconomic indicators, on policy disclosures, on monetary and fiscal policy news, on overall economic outlook news, etc.) is the core of the daily activity in currency trading. Such a keen attention to the latest piece of available information stands in sharp contrast to standard theories of exchange rate determination that concentrate just on the relationship between prices and fundamental macroeconomic and financial variables.
As to these latter theories, the explanation of the short term dynamics of currency prices is not inconsistent with the idea that fundamentals matter but it concentrates not on the relationship between their actual values and exchange rates but rather on the surprise effect (the news) made of differences between their actual values, released by the statistical authorities, and the values expected by financial markets (collected by specialized organizations). This difference can be 12 Whence the ECB "fixing" of the Euro rate at 8:15AM , EST and our decision to follow suit. 13 See Section 4. 14 By polarization we mean here the tendency of the exchange rate to move monotonically for an extended period of time irrespective of a contradicting coeval flow of news and in contrast with fundamentals. We have several episodes of polarization in our sample. This definition is similar to that of a "speculative bubble". See SARNO-TAYLOR(2002) , Section 2.4. Polarization puts a stronger emphasis on a continuously biased interpretation of news with respect to comparable phases of the market. algebraically positive or negative -different from Euro-positive or negative -and has various sizes. They are the "scheduled news", so called because they are published according to a calendar known beforehand.
Scheduled news thus regards macroeconomic announcements by Governments or Central Banks. Amongst the two areas of our exchange rate, the Euro-Dollar, during our sample period, 1999-2004, both United States and Germany have had a calendar of statistical releases of monthly economic indicators made known well ahead, typically in the early hours of their respective trading zones, before the opening of stock markets, with some exceptions, though.
As mentioned in the introduction, the news literature has been using for a long time only scheduled news. More recently, some research results have appeared where aperiodic events -the "unscheduled news" -have also been introduced into the analysis in various forms 15 . This paper uses this type of news extensively as many behavioral features of the foreign exchange markets originate from this class of events.
In principle, unscheduled news consists of an economic, an institutional or a policy event, a declaration or a disclosure, which can be either totally unexpected or -even though expected to occur -has an unknown timing, or an unknown content or both. This news typology, therefore, implies a process of expectation formation very different from that of scheduled news and most likely to be variable overtime.
2.2) Unscheduled News Selection
In order to isolate regularly market-moving or signal-producing unscheduled news from the vast mass of information flooding trading rooms, we first need to assemble a class of events likely to affect the foreign exchange market, we then have to separate this group into two sub-groups, those having a likely appreciating effect on the exchange rate (the €-$, in our case) from those having a depreciating effect.
Therefore, in our type of analysis we need to fix the sign of the impact of an unexpected event a priori. All that requires some statistical analysis and some form of case-by-case decisions. The data bank of events affecting the foreign exchange market, from which a selection of unscheduled news was derived, is being continuously updated and the process of news selection has been going on for a few years, so it has improved overtime 16 . 15 See footnotes 4, 5. 16 A first version of the data bank of events we use, called Newsmetrics, contains news between 1994 and 1997. The description of this data bank is in TIVEGNA-CHIOFI(2004) . The second version goes from 1998 to present and is much more detailed. Originally, the authors of the above book had a long series of interviews with various currency traders to determine the effects of the markets' most frequent news. This activity was accompanied by the reading of the foreign exchange sections of the main international business newspapers. After an initial selection, an extensive statistical analysis was carried out. The reduction from a large number of events to a smaller set of statistically more significant and theoretically more meaningful ones (on the basis of economics and traders' experience) was based on the following steps: 1) all the events potentially connected with the forex market were gathered together; 2) those events most likely to produce a positive effect (exchange rate appreciation) were separated from those with an opposite sign; 3) binary variables (0, 1) were built for both kind of news; 4) exchange rate equations having all significant scheduled news and a so-called "structural " parts (with interest rates, stock market variables -if relevant -various lagged variables, etc) were estimated and the residuals were analyzed in search of small and large outliers; 5) an initial matching of possible news under 2 above and outliers was done and a first set of unscheduled news were tentatively established; 6) using the variables thus constructed, various regression trials on the exchange rates were performed to build an initial taxonomy of news, so that the calculation process determined the sign, the intensity and the significance of each category of events; 7) an analysis of the coefficients and the residuals of the regressions under 6 was performed in order to identify individual events that had a weaker effect on the day's exchange rate variation and therefore of a more uncertain or even opposite sign; 8) based on 7 we modified the vectors of events, with some shifts between news
The experience of news selection, suggests that a combination of statistical testing and qualitative judgment is necessary mainly because the same event can have different impacts in different moments (or no impact at all, for no clear reason), according to time-varying market sentiment. The analysis of this paper confirms that this is true as we could split our sample of Euro existence into three periods where scheduled and unscheduled news had widely different impacts in each one of them.
2.3) News in this paper
As written in the introduction, the empirical analysis in this paper 17 , as well as the procedure leading to the detection of unscheduled news, is organized over the division of the twenty-four hour global trading day into two parts: the European Time Zone (ETZ) going from the US East Coast financial markets closing, at 4PM EST (10PM, CET) the previous day, to 2:15PM, CET (8:15AM, EST), and the American Time Zone (ATZ), from 8:15AM, EST, to US closing the same day at 4PM EST.
Each unscheduled news is assigned to a time zone 18 . The impact of the news is assessed on the variation of the €-$ rate from the end of the time zone where it occurred to the end of the previous time zone.
Both scheduled and unscheduled news must be assigned therefore to the correct time zone. Beginning with the unscheduled news in ETZ, we have the following four typologies: MEU: a miscellaneous of political, monetary and fiscal policy and market events determining expectations on the exchange rate and on the future direction of interest rates 20 .
WEU: a miscellaneous of events, starting in April 2002, associated with various weakening and strengthening phases of €-$ in response to events being different from those under MEU above. They are connected with extreme market positioning, volatile or polarized sentiment towards the US Dollar, Iraq and terror-related news, both before and after the short military phase 21 .
vectors, and then repeated steps 3 to 7 until all the controversial sign assignments were eliminated and a cleaner and final taxonomy of news obtained.
17 And in all previous ones. See TIVEGNA(2002 ), TIVEGNA(2003 , TIVEGNA-CHIOFI(2004) . 18 Their occurrence does not have a precise time stamp. Only scheduled news do. The unscheduled news is referred to one of the two time zones. Particular attention has been used (also with the use of Reuters news-flash archive, where a time stamp is assigned to the report describing the event) to assign a certain news items to the correct time zone. 19 See footnotes 34, 35, 39, 42, 49, 77 in Section 3. 20 See footnotes 36, 40, 45, 48, 52, 53, 59, 73 in Section 3. 21 See footnotes 60, 62, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76 in Section 3. 7 In ATZ we have a corresponding set of unscheduled news, plus one for September 11: 
2.4) News Count
We are trying to explain in this paper twice-daily €-$ returns over 1375 days between January 4, 1999 and April 9, 2004 . It is of some interest to analyze the distribution of the different types of news in this period and a first assessment of their potential influence over the movements of our exchange rate. We assembled three tables. In Table 2 .1, we show -in ETZ and ATZ -the number of observations for each of the twelve news-variable described above -divided between Euro-positive and Euro-negative -and their percentage distribution in the sample.
In Tables 2.2 and 2 .3 we compute in percentage terms, for ETZ and ATZ, how many times the absolute values of €-$ news-concurrent returns are higher than their corresponding means and standard errors (SE) 27 . Here, too, we separate Euro positive and Euro-negative news. A comparison is also made with the percentage of the absolute value of €-$ returns higher than their respective means and SE.
We observe from Tab. 2.1, line 1, that the number of unscheduled news items is higher in ETZ than in ATZ . The overall distribution of the three types of unscheduled news (Policy Statements, Market Events and Dollar Events) is comparable in the two time zones (lines 8, 14, 20) . The percentage of Euro-positive versus Euro negative unscheduled news is slightly less balanced in the two areas (lines 4 and 6) and among the three types of news (lines 10, 12, 16, 18, 22, 24) but the broad picture is consistent with the €-$ movements between the first and last observations in our sample, not being too far apart (1.1827 and 1.2096). The overall percentage of Euro-positive unscheduled news is in fact higher than the Euro-negative's (lines 4 and 6).
Let us speculate a little more on why the number of unscheduled news is much higher in ETZ than in ATZ. This can be due to essentially three reasons. The first is that ETZ includes also trading in Japan and in the Asian area, typically in thin markets: this can cause sharp movements of the exchange rate not attributable to any major news in the fundamentals: unscheduled news are therefore more numerous in ETZ. A second reason is the concentration in the European morning of the statement and disclosure activity by Euroland Policy Makers as opposed, in ATZ, with a tighter grip by the Fed on the talking activity of its Board Members and the substantial neglect by the US of the external value of the Dollar. This explanation is also reinforced by the lack of a common view by Euroland Policy makers on the determinants and consequences of the movements of the Euro, which certainly kept their speech-writers busier than otherwise. A third reason is the tendency of the €-$ to move in ATZ in response to scheduled news and to tangible market factorsthe stock market in primis -and the concentration in the early part of ATZ of London and New York traders, generally more professional in market analysis. This last point is entirely confirmed if we observe that adding statistically significant scheduled and unscheduled news in ATZ we total 461 events, one news less than unscheduled news in ETZ.
As to scheduled news 28 , their number is of course much lower in ETZ than in ATZ (lines 25, 31, 37 in Table 2 .1) -since we consider one in ETZ and three in ATZ -and the percentage weight of Euro-positive and Euro-negative news is balanced in ETZ (lines 28, 30), slightly less so in ATZ (lines 28, 30, 34, 36, 40, 42) 29 .
27 Meaning how many times the delta log of €-$, occurring at the same time of an unscheduled (upper part of the table) and scheduled news (lower part of the table), in ETZ (Tab. 2.2) or ATZ (Tab. 2.3) is -in percentage terms -higher than the corresponding mean (and the corresponding mean plus one standard error). 28 Here again, we want to stress that we mean statistically significant scheduled news. 29 We observe that the number of scheduled news, in our sample, should be 64 for the news being released in the first part of the month (US payrolls, UOC, and ISM; formerly NAPM, UNAPM) and 63 for the others (US GDP, UGDP, and the German IFO, GIFO). The number of two of these news is slightly lower (lines 25, 37) as there are cases where the actual and expected data are equal. Tables 2.2 and 2 .3 offer some preliminary indications -to be confirmed econometrically later -of the €-$-moving potential of our scheduled and unscheduled news. They have four main features. Firstly, the percentage of returns higher than the mean and SE (happening in conjunction with news) is consistently bigger-with two exceptions (lines 13, 17, 14, 18) -in ETZ than in ATZ. That maybe occurs because of the same circumstances outlined above 30 . Secondly, in the aggregate, the amount of returns higher than the mean and the SE is consistently larger -and sometimes much larger -for unscheduled than scheduled news in both trading areas. This is confirmed by our econometric estimates here and elsewhere
31
. Thirdly and somewhat strangely, the percentage of Euro-negative returns higher than the mean and the SE is bigger in ETZ than ATZ and vice-versa (with one small exception) for Euro-positive news. This result is in contrast with what has been maintained for sometime by forex market participants: that trading is $-friendly in ATZ because a spontaneous demand for dollars for commercial transactions and portfolio management is a standard feature in the US morning.
The fourth result is an aggregate one: the proportion of returns higher than the mean and SE when concurrent with scheduled and unscheduled news items -in the aggregate, for Euro-positives and for Euro-negatives -is much higher than the proportion of positive and negative returns in the 1375 observations. This indicates that the occurrence of a news produces a significantly higher return. Compare the upper part of Table 2.2 and Table 2 .3 with the lower part of Table 2 .2.
3.) A History of the €-$ in 1999 -2004
The purpose of going through a detailed history of the €-$ is twofold. To offer a reasonably broad perspective on the nature of unscheduled news -in the footnotes of this section -as this crucially important market-moving news type (at least in our experience) is the most elusive to pinpoint. A second aim, is to produce a dynamic picture of how unscheduled news interacts with the scheduled ones and what is their scope in shaping expectations and determining market sentiment.
We describe the €-$ history with reference to the three sub-periods we were able to separate in the econometric Section 4. They correspond to the depreciating Euro, to the fluctuating Euro and to the Euro rally.
3.1) First Period -from January 4, 1999 to December 15, 2000 The first day of trading of the Euro is January 4, 1999. The first quote of ECB at 2PM is 1.1780 (a visual reference can be made to Fig. 4 .1). After this date, the Euro collapsed almost monotonically until the first week in March (reaching 1.0812 at the end of US trading on March 4 th ) mostly on the following two arguments, both Euro-negative: (1) the initial malfunctioning of the ECB payments system, Target; (2) the "policy shots" between the independent ECB (with a "wait and see" attitude on interest rates at the start of the EMU) and Germany's Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine, who wants monetary policy to support the faltering German growth 32 . This first period ends with the 30 News related to heterogeneity of trading patterns in ETZ , concentration of policy statements in the European morning and the difficulty of finding a common position on the exchange rate in Euroland maybe cause sharper jumps of the €-$. 31 See TIVEGNA(2002) and TIVEGNA-CHIOFI(2004) . 32 The following Financial Times (FT) news stories highlight all points made in the text. All the news described in the footnotes contain the news code (see Table 4 .1) and the percentage returns of €-$ in the relevant time zones.
"Tension between the German government and the European Central Bank over economic policy escalated today when Oskar Lafontaine, the German finance minister, said it would be "completely wrong" for governments to cut spending in the current economic climate. The comment highlights the growing impasse in economic policy in the 11-nation euro-zone, as finance ministers and the ECB blame each other for the slowdown" (FT, 2/18/999), DEU -0.7, DUS -resignation of Lafontaine in late afternoon on March 11 th , causing a sharp spike up of the Euro, 141 BP during US trading.
Following the Lafontaine story, a good part of Euro-Dollar fluctuations on a downward trend in this period is caused by the Euro-negative war in Yugoslavia-Kosovo (from the end of March to the approval of the international peace plan for Kosovo by the UN on June 10). Another important factor in Euro weakness is the beginning of "policy statements confusion" by European Policy Makers on the appropriate level of the Euro, from the end of May through to the end of the Summer 33 .
This noisy and confusing debate grows in intensity overtime and it is indicated by most market reports as the main cause for Euro weakness, eventually leading to a deep distrust of ECB monetary policy and of Wim Duisenberg, personally, by foreign exchange markets.
The balance of 1999 saw the Euro fluctuating above parity up to a maximum of 1.10 in midOctober. After the minima of early July, the Euro had an upward bounce from parity partly induced by $-negative emerging markets jitters, "cyclical" concerns over the financing of the US trade deficit and positive news on French and German growth. Then the Euro dropped again by ten-0.34.
33 "A flurry of comments by German officials further depressed the euro in thin trading ahead of the outcome of the G7 meeting. While warning against a policy of neglect, Hans Tietmeyer, president of the Bundesbank, said the present level of the euro against the dollar was appropriate. His remarks were echoed by Hans Eichel, Germany's new finance minister, who said the euro's decline was a process of "normalisation" which was not a matter of concern" (FT, 4/26/1999), DEU -0.01. "The euro staged a modest recovery after a string of European monetary officials moved to counter the market's perception that they were following a policy of benign neglect" (FT, 4/27/1999), DEU +0.43. "Market players bid the dollar lower against the euro, increasing dollar sales after European Central Bank President Wim Duisenberg added his voice to the growing chorus of concern for a weak euro" (FT, 4/27/1999), DUS +0.35. "The muted response of European officials to the euro's recent slide caused many analysts to question whether the ECB's pain threshold had shifted. They said that today's statements from monetary officials were in stark contrast to the spirited defence put up when the euro dipped to $1.056 last month" (FT, 5/27/1999), DUS -0.35. "Romano Prodi, president-designate of the European Commission, triggered a drop in the euro's value after suggesting that Italy could drop out of the euro-zone because of a lack of industrial competitiveness" (FT, 6/21/1999), DEU -0.52. "The euro made a bid to steal sterling's limelight later in the London session as traders saw comments from Hans Eichel, the German finance minister, as an excuse to push the currency further towards parity with the dollar. Mr Eichel said that there was no problem with a weak euro, which would be good for euro-zone exports. His remarks were the latest in a series of comments from European policy-makers which seem to imply that intervention is unlikely unless the euro seriously undershoots " (FT, 7/8/1999), DEU -0.41. "After sinking rapidly in early European trading after bearish comments from Horst Siebert, one of the "Wise Men" who advise the German government on economic policy, a retraction of the remarks was enough to undo the damage against the dollar. Later in the day, the euro staged a small revival, pushing above $1.02 against the dollar" (FT, 7/14/1999), DEU -0.06. "While the euro was stronger in US trading, it had been undermined earlier in Europe by verbal indiscipline among European officials. Most damaging of the recent comments came from Eugenio Domingo Solans, a member of the ECB's executive board, who said Europe's monetary authorities would not raise interest rates to defend the euro. In contrast to the hawkish tone taken last week by Wim Duisenberg, the president of the ECB, Mr Solans said "neither the evolution of money in circulation nor inflation forecasts lead to the conclusion that interest rates needed to be changed" (FT, 7/19/1999) , DEU -0.51. "Ernst Welteke, the Bundesbank's new president, caused confusion in foreign exchange Markets by first expressing support for the euro's current exchange rate against the dollar and then withdrawing his remarks" (FT, 9/7/1999) 34 Here is a sample of statements: "European financial officials weren't mincing words in touting the case for tighter monetary policy in the euro-zone. But their support for higher interest rates did little to boost the euro, which declined throughout the day against the dollar and fell to its lowest level in a month against the yen. European Central Bank President Wim Duisenberg told members of the European Parliament that raising interest rates was more akin to a driver lifting his foot from the accelerator than putting on the brakes "(FT, 10/26/1999), DEU -0.42, DUS -0.38. "Otmar Issing, the chief economist at the Bundesbank, rode to the defence of the euro, helping to reverse a slump against the dollar. Mr Issing gave his clearest signal yet that the European Central Bank was likely to raise interest rates in the near future when he said that monetary growth was moving further above the ECB's reference value and that the reasons for the "precautionary" cut in interest rates in April had now disappeared" (FT, 10/29/1999), DUS +0.96. "The euro was undermined in trading by two European Central Bank officials who indicated the bank wasn't likely to intervene on behalf of the single currency. Executive Board Member Eugenio Domingo Solans said the central bank has "no intention of intervening" to prevent the euro from falling to dollar parity, while Otmar Issing, the European Central Bank's influential chief economist, said the importance of foreign-exchange rates has "substantially declined." The statements knocked the wind out of the euro as it began recovering from losses Wednesday, when the euro fell to a record low against the yen and threatened to do the same against the Dollar" (FT, 11/25/1999), DUS -0.04. "A further fall in the euro's external exchange rate will not by itself provoke the European Central Bank into raising interest rates, Wim Duisenberg, the ECB president, said today. Speaking after a meeting of the ECB's governing council at which it left its benchmark interest rate at 3 per cent, Mr Duisenberg said the euro had potential to rise in value and he would be concerned if that did not eventually happen: "But these things always take time." The euro fell almost to parity with the dollar in Europe today only hours after Mr Duisenberg's remarks, dropping to a lifetime low of $1.0010 before pulling back slightly" (FT, 12/02/1999), DEU -0.27, DUS -0.38. "The euro fell below $1.02 against the dollar on Thursday after unhelpful comments from Otmar Issing, the chief economist of the European Central Bank. The fall, in the middle of the European session, also dragged the dollar lower against the yen. The euro dropped after the usually emollient Mr Issing tweaked the tail of currency traders by appearing to gloat that speculators had "burnt their fingers" in the attempt to push the euro below parity" (FT, 12/09/1999), DEU -1.03. 35 "The euro fell to records against the dollar and pound, undermined by political instability in Italy and remarks by an important Austrian politician. Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema resigned Wednesday following several days of political turmoil triggered by a victory of center-right coalition parties in local elections Sunday. Conservative politicians, led by a former prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, are appealing to Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi for early elections. Meanwhile, Joerg Haider, former leader of Austria's Freedom Party, said in an interview published Wednesday that his country should consider leaving the EU in response to diplomatic sanctions imposed on Austria by members of the 15-nation union, after Mr. Haider's party became part of a coalition government" (FT, 4/19/2000) , MEU -0.13, MUS -0.55. 36 "The European Central Bank raised interest rates Thursday by 0.25 percentage points, its fourth successive increase since November. The rise failed to stop the euro hitting a hat-trick of record lows against the dollar, the yen and sterling. The euro plunged to below $0.91 just minutes after the ECB decision and finished London trading only fractionally higher at $0.912. Its slide resumed in New York where in late afternoon it was trading at around $0.9098. "Confidence in the euro has been so badly bruised over the past days that it would have been naive to expect a 25 basis point rise to do much good," said Mark Cliffe, chief economist at ING-Barings" (FT, 04/27/2000) , leading to more tightening without any interest for stagflation risks). After some fluctuations around 0.90 in the first week of May, Euroland leaders succeed in supporting the Euro through verbal intervention; afterwards, fears of a US slowdown steps in and the Euro breathes a little until June 8, when ECB surprises markets with a larger than expected 0.50 rate increase and causes the second perverse drop of the Euro 37 , followed by further drops in July and August. The European currency fluctuates between 0.93 and 0.96 for the balance of June.
The descent resumes in July on doubts over the Danish referendum, for the adoption of the Euro, and continues in September with Euro-devastating statements by Schroeder, not worried about a weaker currency ). This last policy disclosure, in particular, leaves the market with the firm belief that Euroland Policy Makers want a weaker Euro which thus collapses towards 0.80, forcing a joint intervention by ECB and other major European and international Central Banks to support it on September 22, 2000. But the depreciation resumes immediately after the intervention. The ECB raises interest rates on October 5 but the Euro does not stop depreciating 39 , partly because of a confusing statement by Duisenberg, ruling out any more interventions by ECB 40 . The subsequent press uproar 41 on the adequacy of Mr. Duisenberg at the helm of ECB does not help the Euro.
Near the end of November -and near the Euro historic minimum -a sudden large order by a Middle East bank sparks a recovery of the Euro, nourished by fears of a softer US economy and of a lesser commitment to Dollar strength by the Republican Administration. The appointment of Paul 37 "The European Central Bank surprised financial markets on Thursday when it raised interest rates by a larger than expected 0.5 percentage points. Citing a risk that inflation would breach the ECB's 2 per cent target this year and in 2001, the bank raised its main lending rate to 4.25 per cent from 3.75 per cent. It was the fifth rise since November, when the rate was 2.5 per cent. The euro had a bumpy ride on the foreign exchange markets on Thursday as the market struggled to decide whether a surprisingly aggressive rate rise was good or bad for the currency. The euro initially bolted almost a cent higher after the European Central Bank lifted the refinancing rate by 50 basis points to 4.25 per cent. With rates playing a central role in recent currency movements, many market observers expected to move to be sustained. In fact the euro quickly tumbled lower, giving up all of its post rate rise gains and more" (FT, 06/08/2000), MEU +0.42, MUS -1.01. 38 "When Gerhard Schroeder, the German chancellor, suggested that policymakers should be satisfied with the weakness of the euro as a way of boosting exports, there was little immediate response in the market. But as traders have digested the comments sentiment has soured further on the euro. Market participants are concerned by the clash between MrSchroeder's nonchalance and the evident eagerness of euro-zone central bankers to push the currency higher" (FT, 9/05/2000), DEU -1.16. "The euro tumbled to lifetime lows against the dollar and yen on Wednesday after a German government spokeswoman insisted that Chancellor Gerhard Schroder was not concerned about the euro's weakness on foreign exchange markets. The fall came despite positive economic data from Germany" (FT, 9/06/2000), DEU -0.87, DUS -1.16. 39 "The European Central Bank raised euro-zone interest rates by 0.25 percentage points to 4.75 per cent on Thursday, with economists sharply divided on the wisdom of its decision. The markets reacted with equal confusion. The euro soared half a cent within less than an hour of the news to $0.878, before falling again within two hours to $0.872, just below the pre-announcement level of $0.873" (FT, 10/05/2000), MEU +0.38, MUS -0.94. 40 "The euro fell close to its all-time low on Monday after comments by Wim Duisenberg, the president of the European Central Bank, exposed disarray in Europe's policy towards the ailing currency. In an interview with a British newspaper, Mr Duisenberg dampened hopes of imminent intervention to support the euro" (FT, 10/16/2000), DEU -0.25. 41 "Wim Duisenberg was engulfed in a storm of criticism on Tuesday over his performance as president of the European Central Bank, but offered no sign that he was considering resignation" (FT, 10/17/2000), DEU -0.10. "Wim Duisenberg, the beleaguered president of the European Central Bank, on Thursday acknowledged that he must make no more market-sensitive remarks about the euro. He received strong support from Jean-Claude Trichet, the Bank of France governor and Mr Duisenberg's designated successor, who described the ECB's 17-member council as "a united team, a team which is warmly united behind our president, Wim Duisenberg". But German officials said Hans Eichel, German finance minister, and his "in light of further weakening of sales and production and in the context of lower consumer confidence, tight conditions in some segments of financial markets and high energy prices, sapping households and business purchasing power" (from Fed end-of-meeting statement). This is a period of stabilization of the €-$, corresponding to a phase of slow-down of the US economy and a peak (and subsequent droop) in the stock market. This new situation of the US economy is effectively underlined by the very rare intra-meeting cut by the Fed. 9/11 and its aftermath is super-imposed on this slow-down and on a slumping Wall Street. The €-$ depreciation is also stopped by rising concerns on the "strong-Dollar" commitment by the US Administration, which begins to materialize in this sub-period.
The prompt reaction of the US Central Bank to this emerging softness in the US economy will be frequently contrasted in the following months with the immobility of ECB and its perceived faulty reading of inflation/growth tradeoffs and risks for the Euroland economy. Fluctuations of the Euro on a slightly downward trend in January-February 2001 are determined by a comparison of "relative softness" of the US economy and Euroland's and by a close monitoring of Treasury Secretary O'Neill dollar philosophy, which is looked at suspiciously because of his manufacturing background, even though he seems to be willing to continue the "strong Dollar" stance of his two predecessors (Rubin and Summers) 42 . The equivocal interview by the Treasury Secretary with a German newspaper, on February 17, 2001, and the following day's announcement that he would "hire the Yankee Stadium to announce an hypothetical change in Dollar policy" 43 , confirm that something is changing. In an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the German daily, Mr O'Neill said: "We are not pursuing, as it is often said, a policy of a strong dollar. In my opinion, a strong dollar is the result of a strong economy." A swift assertion from a treasury spokesman that there had been no change in policy limited the comments' impact on markets, but the dollar fell about half a cent against the euro anyway after the remarks" (FT, 2/16/2001), DEU+0.71. "Paul O'Neill, the plain-speaking US treasury secretary, has paid the price in the last week for a willingness to engage in even the most limited public debate about the principles and practicalities of exchange rate policy. In remarkably blunt remarks after the G7 finance ministers' and central bank governors' meeting in Palermo on Saturday, Mr O'Neill acknowledged he had made a "mistake" in discussing with newspapers "the intellectual fabric around the subject of dollar policy". And in a characteristically colourful declaration of intent, he said he would "hire the Yankee Stadium" to announce any alteration to exchange rate policy from that of his predecessors, Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers" (FT, 2/18/2001), DEU +0.69 (also from turmoil in Turkey's financial markets). 44 "The euro pushed higher on Monday as traders continued to speculate on the prospect of an interest rate cut from the European Central Bank later in the week. Otmar Issing, the ECB's chief economist, said that the risk to growth had mounted while the threat posed by inflation was receding" (FT, In the following week, Germany produced very bad numbers on unemployment and manufacturing orders. On May 10, ECB cut rates by a "token" quarter percentage point based on a benign revision of M3 growth 46 . On the following day, five Euroland countries report higher than expected inflation 47 . This whole story -highlighting ECB "ad-hockery" -caused a five-figures drop of the Euro to a little above 0.84. The period of weakness was concluded by Wim Duisenberg saying that an intervention was not needed to support the Euro 48 .
Movements of the Euro in March and
"The European Central Bank on Thursday left its key interest rates unchanged at least for a further fortnight, underlining its determination not to be rushed into rate-cutting by the global economic slowdown" (FT, 3/29/2001), MEU -0.24, MUS -0.09. "The euro fell to its lowest level of the year on Thursday as traders expressed their disappointment at the failure of the European Central Bank to cut interest rates. The ECB is now the only main central bank to refuse to follow the Federal Reserve since it started to cut rates in January. "The perception in the market has been that they are not doing enough to protect European growth," said Chris Furness, senior currency strategist at economic consultancy 4Cast" (FT, 3/29/2001), MEU -0.24, MUS -0.09. "Senior members of the European Central Bank made an effort on Wednesday to clarify the bank's monetary policy stance after almost two weeks of confusion that have left financial markets uncertain when or whether an interest rate cut is in the offing. The euro rose strongly on Wednesday on rising hopes of an ECB interest rate cut next week, even though there appeared to be little in the council members' latest statements to justify it. Mr Duisenberg, giving the barest hint that the ECB would make its first rate cut since last October, said the ECB was constantly scrutinising the euro-zone economy for signs of easing price pressures. Financial markets raised their hopes of an ECB rate cut after economic data pointing to a slowing economy and milder inflation in the euro-zone. German unemployment went up and the European Commission's business climate indicator went down in March, while euro-zone producer price inflation eased in February" ( 46 "A surprise cut in interest rates by the European Central Bank failed to lift the fortunes of the euro on Thursday. The ECB has been the last of the main central banks to ease monetary policy in response to a swift deterioration in the prospects for world growth. But the market's eagerness to see rates come down was partly offset by a perception that the ECB had failed to communicate its thinking to the market" (FT, 5/10/2001), MUS -0.34. "The euro was sent reeling against the dollar following the European Central Bank's surprise quarter-percentage-point rate cut, amid uncertainties about the central bank's monetary policies. In the news conference following the decision, ECB president Wim Duisenberg said that "monetary developments no longer pose a risk to price stability." A revision in March M3 money-supply growth to 4.4% from 5% was a large factor in the rate cut, Mr. Duisenberg said, after "significant distortions" were discovered in the original data reported April 30. Though the containment of M3 growth is one of the ECB's main policy pillars, some were skeptical of the impetus for the ECB's switch, and suggested that this week's series of weak German economic data was a more pressing factor" (FT, 5/10/2001), MUS -0.34.
The Euro fluctuated in June amidst talks of replacing Duisenberg 49 and further lobbying by NAM for a weaker Dollar 50 . In July-August, the Dollar actually started to weaken because of emerging markets problems 51 and fears of a slowdown in the US economy 52 , further underlined by a rather pessimistic US Congress testimony by A.Greenspan on July 18 53 . The NAM was still lobbying heavily and that was behind a sharp drop of the Dollar on August 15, on thin market conditions 54 . At the end-of-August-beginning-of-September we observed sharp fluctuations of the €-$ pair for various reasons. Then came September 11.
After 9/11 and 2002 From a macroeconomic perspective, the immediate expectation after the Twin Towers attack was for a sharp drop in consumer sentiment 55 and resulting doubts on the growth outlook for the US. From the macrofinancial perspective, a sharply lower appetite for US assets by the rest of the world was expected, leading to a re-emerging of the issue of the US trade deficit financing by capital inflows 56 . The "news watchers" concentrated -from the end of 2001 into 2002 -on macroeconomic announcements in the US, on evaluations by A.Greenspan of the outlook and, last but not least, on the response to terror by the US and the geopolitical risks associated with capital flows 57 .
49 "European Union policymakers have begun to reconsider who should succeed Wim Duisenberg as president of the European Central Bank. Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of Luxembourg, said in Frankfurt on Thursday that he had turned down an approach to run the ECB after Mr Duisenberg's retirement, expected at some point next year" (FT, 6/28/2001), DEU -0.93. 50 "The dollar lurched more than a cent lower against the euro on Thursday after the head of the National Association of Manufacturers said urged the US to temper its strong dollar policy. Jerry Jasinowski said the dollar was between 25 and 30 per cent overvalued and was harming US industry. Strategists said that the comments looked to have caught a market that was short dollars" (FT, 6/14/2001), MUS +1.23. 51 "Over the past few trading sessions, the turmoil in emerging markets has been spilling over into the major currencies. So far the impact appears to have been due largely to the unwinding of carry trades -a strategy that involves borrowing in a low-yielding currency to invest in a high yielding currency. The swift fall in emerging markets has forced traders to buy back the currencies used to fund such bets, most notably the yen and the Swiss franc" (FT, 7/12/2001), MEU -0.55. 52 "The dollar fell sharply against all its major counterparts, tumbling 2% against the yen and 1.5% against the euro, as growing pessimism about the U.S. economy and more complaints about the strong-dollar policy combined to push the currency down" "The risk premium of investing in equities in the U.S. has increased," says Guillaume Joncheres, who manages $37 billion in stock at Credit Lyonnais Asset Management in Paris. Mr. Joncheres says the firm has been reducing its U.S. exposure for the past few months and has trimmed it further since the attacks"(FT, 9/25/2001), MUS +0.49. 57 "Economic activity was weak across the US in September and the first half of October, as the effects of last month's terrorist attacks compounded downward momentum in place before September 11, the Federal Reserve said in its Beige Book. The Fed said spending and output dropped sharply in the week after the Twin Towers attacks"(FT, 10/24/2001), MUS +0.18. "The dollar came under pressure from the euro and yen but was able to contain its losses in what proved to be a rudderless market. Nevertheless, traders are losing confidence in the dollar's ability to make gains from current levels, with doubts over the strength of the U.S. recovery underlined by Wednesday's assessment from Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who appeared to avoid much of the upbeat language he used just a week ago.The dollar is also suffering from a growing sentiment that the U.S. officials are less committed to the "strong dollar" policy, with
European outlook and policy issues remained largely sidelined, always focusing, though, on the excessive conservatism of ECB monetary policy. Two further macro events occurred in this period: the Enron scandal (from the end of November 58 ) and the beginning of the physical circulation of the Euro (from January 4, 2002). The Enron episode is seldom directly recalled by the collection of €-$ market-moving news in this period but is at the very heart of the sharp drop of the US stock market in the first ten months of 2002 (and the resulting weakening of the Dollar). The launch of the Euro was widely expected to be associated with a pick up of its exchange rate as one of the explanations offered of its long decline was its lack of physicality. That indeed occurred from the end of March, but it is uncertain that it occurred for this reason. In any case, the Euro begins its almost relentless recovery vis-à-vis the Dollar 59 .
3.
3) The Third Period -from July 22, 2002 to April 9, 2004 Ever-increasing doubts over the "strong-Dollar" policy by the US Administration, the collapse of Wall Street following the corporate scandals of Enron, Tyco and other names, the connected reappearing worries on the financing of the US trade deficit and -last but not least -the Iraq crisis are all elements that explain the almost monotonic strengthening of the Euro in this period.
Between April 1 and July 19, 2002 we observed an €-$ run towards parity (a maximum of 1.015 was reached), without any solid or compelling forex market determinant, apart from an increasing skepticism over a "strong Dollar policy" by the US 60 and an ever-growing disappointment over accounting standards and corporate morality which hit Wall Street in connection with Enron, Tyco, and, to a lesser extent, Merck and other names 61 . The exchange rate of the €-$ pair went from about some suggesting that the Bush administration's recent imposition of steel import tariffs was a recognition that domestic industry is being hurt by the strength of the dollar.Thursday, these fears were reinforced by a resolution passed by the National Association of Manufacturers, calling for a change in U.S. dollar policy"(FT, 3/14/2002), MEU +0.47, MUS +0.23. 58 "In a volatile session, the dollar fell through key technical support levels against both the euro and the yen early in the day, as the financial woes of Enron Corp. helped to amplify already-negative sentiment toward the dollar" (FT, 11/29/2001) , MEU + 0.03. 59 "The dollar fell to a three-month low against the euro and remained near that level after Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, remained cautious on the strength and sustainability of the US recovery.The euro briefly broke above its 200-day moving average of $0.8892 and although there appeared to be no particular catalyst for this move, it was enough to encourage long suffering euro bulls."It is hard to predict when the turning point will come, but there has long been many fundamental reasons to expect the euro to move higher," said one trader"(FT, 4/17/2002), WEU +0.59. This is the first news with this type of code. "The dollar came under renewed pressure, falling close to its lowest levels of the year against European currencies. Concerns over the durability of the US economic recovery have been intensifying in recent days. These worries were underlined after AOL Time Warner reported a $54.25bn loss for the first quarter. Confidence among economists over growth in the second quarter is fading. This combination led to heavy selling of the dollar across the board. The euro managed to push to within a whisker of the psychologically important $0. news acted as a "double whammy" for the dollar, and helped the euro to a two-week high at $1.0128, up more than a cent on the day, early in the US session"FT, 12/06/2002), WUS +0.92. 66 "The discovery of empty chemical warheads in Iraq by United Nations weapons inspectors dissolved levels of support under the dollar, pushing it to new multiyear lows against the euro and the Swiss franc on fears that a war might be more likely now.Iraq denied that the discovery, of 11 empty chemical warheads in "excellent" condition, represented the "smoking gun" that could precipitate a U.S.-led war, saying the weapons found were old artillery warheads that were accounted for in its December statement"(FT, 1/16/2003), WUS +0.55.
67 "Colin Powell, US secretary of state, on Thursday acknowledged "sharp differences" between the US and its European allies over war with Iraq and left the door open for a further UN resolution that would preserve the unity of the transatlantic alliance.While senior US officials sought to counter the impression of Washington's isolation, European diplomats said efforts were under way to probe the possibility of giving UN weapons inspectors more time in Iraq. But an extension would amount to weeks, not months, they added. Russia and China, permanent members of the UN Security Council, are lining up behind France and Germany and backing calls by the chief UN inspectors to be given more time"(FT, 1/23/03), WEU +0.27, in anticipation of a widely expected statement. "The dollar fell for a second day against the euro as some investors bet U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell will present evidence to the United Nations that will make a war with Iraq more likely. The dollar dropped to $1.0803 per euro at 8.55 a.m. in London from $1.0770. Powell is scheduled to appear before the United Nations Security Council to present what he called ``compelling'' evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction"(Bloomberg, 2/04/03), WEU +0.43. "The dollar fell in US trading against its major rivals, a casualty of market uncertainty ahead of a presentation by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, which is expected to further the U.S case to disarm Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein by any means(FT, 2/04/2003), WUS +0.61. 68 "Donald Rumsfeld, US secretary of defence, said on Tuesday the US could still go to war if the British government decided to pull its forces out of an Iraqi invasion, but emphasised that UK participation in an attack "would obviously be welcomed".Following a meeting withGeoff Hoon, UK defence minister, Mr Rumsfeld said the US was in nearly daily contact with the British government regarding the role of UK forces in an invasion, but said there were "workarounds" -contingency plans -if Tony Blair opted out"(FT, 3/11/2004), WEU +0.22. 69 "The dollar fell against the yen and the euro as U.S. President George W. Bush said Iraq is in defiance of demands to end its development of weapons, making a war more in the Middle East country more likely"(Bloomberg, 1/29/2003), WEU +0.47,in anticipation. "The dollar fell back to its lowest level this week against the Euro on Thursday as further hawkish rhetoric from President Bush and Tony Blair, the UK prime minister, sparked fresh investor concerns about the likelihood of US-led military action against Iraq.The greenback's ongoing sensitivity to geopolitical events was highlighted as it fell more than a cent against the euro after news broke overnight that Iraq's Al Samoud 2 missile system had a longer operational range than is allowed, the first clear sign Baghdad has continued to develop weapons in defiance of UN"(FT2/13/2003), WEU +0.41, WUS +0.77. "The dollar fell to a four-year low against the euro after President George W. Bush said the U.S. doesn't need United Nations backing to attack Iraq, boosting speculation an attack will begin by the end of this month"(FT, 3/07/2003), WEU +0.65. "By the standard of recent sessions, the dollar had a quiet day on Tuesday, as investors paused for breath in the midst of a US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq.The currency continued to move higher, extending its rally to four days and more than 4 per cent, but gains were harder won as a note of caution re-entered the market.Mr Bush, in a television address on Monday night, told Saddam that he and his sons had 48 hours to leave Iraq or face war after the US and UK abandoned diplomatic efforts to disarm the country" (FT, 3/18/2003) , WEU +0.51. 70 "The dollar fell for a record 10th day against the euro amid speculation United Nations chief weapons inspector Hans Blix will tell the Security Council that Iraq has failed to comply with a resolution to disarm(Bloomberg, 1/27/2003), beginning of the Iraq invasion on March 20, to the fluctuating phases of the war until the almost symbolic capture of Baghdad, with the toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue in the main square of the city on April 9.
After the end of the open fight, Iraq stops having a direct effect on the US currency. A Dollarnegative impulse originated now from the growing belief that the US Administration is not anymore behind a strong Dollar and from ever-increasing concern on the US growth outlook 71 . It is interesting to notice that the €-$ exchange rate went from about 1.0500 at the beginning of the final phase of the Iraq crisis, in January 2003, to about 1.0800 on the day the statue of Saddam fell (April 9). The following leg of Dollar depreciation after the official end of the war, induced by dollar policy doubts and concern on the US economy, produced a much wider jump: from 1.0800, on April 9, to the peak of 1.1900, between the end of May and the beginning of June 2003, when a correction occurred, apparently for the simple and single reason that the currency pair reached its maximum since the existence of the Euro. The subsequent correction continued through the Summer, until about 1.085 up to the end of August, determined by no specific catalyst, except a good stock market run in Wall Street. "Anticipation of possible sustained pressure on the dollar swept through financial markets around the world on Monday after the weekend meeting of G7 industrial nations.The US currency tumbled to a near-three-year low against the yen, stock markets from Tokyo to Wall Street were shaken by the potential impact on exporters, the yield on US Treasuries jumped and precious metals rose as investors sought safe havens. Markets concluded that the G7 call for "more flexibility in exchange rates" would force Asian central banks to ease currency intervention which has kept the dollar strong and favoured domestic exporters"(FT, 9/22/2003), MEU +1.07. "The dollar fell to a fresh low against the euro on Wednesday as the selling that took currency investors by surprise on Tuesday continued. The euro reached a new lifetime high against the dollar at $1.2128 in midday European trade, beating the $1.2113 high it set in early Asian trade. Sterling was at $1.7296, off the $1.7317 five-year peak it set in the Asian session.The dollar failed to take comfort in data showing US productivity grew by its fastest rate in the third quarter, and the euro held near its highs, trading at $1.208 by mid-session in New York."The market is increasingly appreciation phases of the Euro. The first, as we noted above, was the consequence of the Dubai G7; the second, from early November 2003 to mid-January 2004, was determined by consolidation in the market of the belief of a weak-Dollar policy on the part of the US Authorities 73 , not sufficiently counteracted by European Policy Makers (up to a point), by frequent terror warnings in the US, in Europe and even in Japan 74 , and by the eruption of a seemingly unstoppable guerrilla warfare in Iraq and troubles in Palestine. The Euro reached twice a peak of 1.2900. The first time it was stopped by a concerted verbal intervention by ECB top officials (Trichet, Welteke, Noyer), around mid-January 2004, the second time, in mid-February, by fears of verbal interventions. After this last spike, the Euro has been pushed back around 1.2000 -and fluctuating thereabouts -in the remaining part of our sample by a number of conflicting factors: a very welcome strengthening of the US labour market, in March and April ($-positive), concern about the financing of the huge US current account deficit ($-negative), further verbal interventions by top European Policy Makers (Schroeder and Raffarin, on February 26 2004, complain for excessive Euro strength 75 ), hints by Trichet and other ECB officials 76 of possible interest rate cuts (€-negative, in this phase).
4.) The Econometrics of News Impact
We modeled the twice-daily exchange rate returns of the €-$ spot exchange rate (EUUSETZ and EUUSATZ, see Tab. 4.1 for the description of the symbols used in this paper) using one equation for each area (ETZ and ATZ) and making reference to the formulation in (1.1) in paragraph 1. Each equation was expressed as a linear function of fundamentals and of various news, both scheduled and unscheduled, as indicated in the following equations.
seeing the dollar's fall as a one-way bet -it's an early Christmas present for those closing their books and taking profits this month," said Gary Noone, analyst at MMS(FT, 12/03/2003), WEU +0.25, WUS +0.11, after a WUS +1.02 the previous day.
73 "Then came an interview with Mr. Snow on Bloomberg Television. Asked if he was concerned about the dollar's depreciation, the Treasury secretary said he wasn't, adding that "this whole adjustment process has been orderly.""The dollar on a trade-weighted basis is still higher than it has been for most of the last 25 years," Mr. Snow said.Dealers said Mr. Snow's comments effectively gave the market a green light to sell the dollar"(WSJ, 12/12/2003), WEU +0.45, WUS +0.40. 74 "Geopolitical concerns resurfaced in the currency markets on Monday on reports al-Qaeda could target Japan and following the weekend bombings in Turkey. European traders also looked to the heavy security planned for the state visit of president George W Bush to the UK which begins on Tuesday.The jitters first sent the yen lower in Asian hours, and helped keep the dollar under pressure throughout most of the European session(FT, 11/17/2003), WEU +0.20. "Jean Claude Trichet, the European Central Bank president, on Monday gave his strongest signal yet of mounting concern in Europe over the rapid rise of the euro, saying "brutal" moves in the dollar were unwelcome"(FT, 1/12/2004), DUS -0.81. "European Central Bank council member Ernst Welteke said he's concerned the stronger euro risks reining in a recovery in Germany's economy, Europe's largest. ``We fear that the appreciation of the euro could put a brake on the recovery,'' Welteke, who also heads the Bundesbank, said in a speech in Berlin"(FT, 1/13/2004), DEU +0.02. "The euro dropped against the dollar in London after European Central Bank council member Christian Noyer said currency sales are an option for the central bank"(FT 1/14/2004), DEU -0.74. 75 "The growing prospect of a rate cut by the European Central Bank sent the euro to a four-week low against the dollar on Thursday. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, the French prime minister, echoed German chancellor Gerhard Schröder when he said the euro-dollar rate was "not good for the either the US or Europe"(FT2/26/2004), WEU -0.52, WUS -0.11. 76 "European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet said the bank may lower its economic growth forecasts if consumer demand fails to pick up, stoking speculation about a reduction in interest rates. The euro fell against the dollar and interest-rate futures prices surged after the comments from Trichet and fellow ECB council member Guy Quaden. Quaden, head of Belgium's central bank, told French newspaper Le Monde that the ECB still has ``some ammunition'' to boost economic growth"(Blomberg, All the literature on exchange rates and news estimates contemporaneous relationships, what we call the "Rational Model" (equations 1 and 2 in Tables 4.3 -4.8), using all available information at the time the endogenous phenomenon occurs, as in the above two equations (4.1) and (4.2). As we mentioned in Section 1, the use of unscheduled news is relatively new in this line of research. Scheduled news, though, have been used extensively, a much larger set than the one we will use below (one in ETZ and three in ATZ). We employed this small set at the end of a reduction process from a much larger number 77 .
To investigate the issue whether the sign of surprises (i.e. positive and negative events for the Euro) produced different effects, we divided each news variable into two series. One series including only positive surprises and one series comprising only negative surprises 78 . Moreover, for macroeconomic scheduled news we addressed also the issues as to whether the size of news could produce asymmetric effects. To this end, we divided the series of scheduled news into three components: large positive news (LP), large negative news (LN) and average news, both positive and negative (AV). For each macroeconomic news items, the distinction into large (positive and negative) and average was based on identification of those quantitative outcomes that would deviate more than one standard deviation from the news' sample mean.
These above three categories of news (LP, LN and AV), combined with the series of positive and negative ones, can account for all possible asymmetries of every order of magnitude. To test for asymmetric reactions to signs and sizes of scheduled news and to test the relevance of stale news, we followed the following three-step procedure: 1) Firstly, for each trading area, we estimated a standard equation, according to the rational/market efficient paradigm for the period January 4 th 1999 -April 9 th 2004, identifying the fundamentals and those news items -scheduled and unscheduled, positive and negative, large and average, as indicated above -that were statistically and economically relevant in affecting the returns of the exchange rate. They are the equations 1 and 2 in Tables 4.2 -4.8.
2) Secondly, in these standard-type equations -that could be represented as (4.1) and (4.2) -we then included some additional news: the news of the previous trading area, and past news of the 77 The specification search and reduction process for scheduled news is described in CAGLIESI-TIVEGNA (2005 As expected, no past news in any area exerted any explanatory effect, except for the past UOC in the American zone (see Table 4 .2, equation 2, coefficient 9). This finding confirms, and it is consistent with the vast empirical work produced in the literature of exchange rate and news 79 .
3) Thirdly we tested for regime breaks 80 . By using a Chow dummy type of test, we identified two breaking points and three regimes. The first regime runs from January 4, 1999 to December 15, 2000 and corresponds to the phase of the falling value of the Euro. The second regime, running from December 18, 2000 to July 19, 2002 and it corresponds to the phase of a strong but stable 79 See footnotes 2 and 3. 80 The identification of different regimes was the result of an iterative procedure. We started out by looking at a detailed historical prospective and analysis of the data in our sample to see if we could interpret trigger points and events that had determined some idiosyncratic switches of trading themes and sentiments in the exchange rate market. The historical interpretation offered us some broad indication about possible exchange rate regime. We corroborated this first round identification by running the Hansen general stability test with unknown breaking points. Hansen's test is implemented in RATS as a procedure testing the joint hypotheses of constancy of all coefficients and variance, as well as individual coefficients and variance. The procedure provided us with a better indication about possible structural breaking points. We then applied a Chow dummy test that allows accounting for possible heteroskedasticity and for constancy of some coefficients (CHOW(1983) ). We estimated the model by using Robusterrors procedure, to take into account the fact that different regimes might have different variances of the error term (as also indicated by Hansen's test). The test statistic is thus a Chi square. For each area, we tested only the «rational/efficient hypotheses» model, without any lagged news and any asymmetries. The stability hypothesis was tested firstly over a version of the rational specification that included only the fundamentals, and subsequently was tested using all current news, scheduled and unscheduled. For all estimates in all areas, the null hypothesis of stability was rejected. The results were as follows: for the American zone, Chi-square(14) = 24.01 with a significance level of 4.56%, and Chi-square(25)= 43.63 with a significance level of 1.2%; for the European zone, Chi-square(8)=29.86 with a significance level of 0.02% and Chisquare(15)=66.03 with a significance level of 0%.
value of the dollar. The third regime, running from July 22, 2002 to April 9, 2004 corresponds to the phase of rising value of the Euro. 4) Fourthly, for each regime, we re-estimated the standard rational/efficient market model equations (4.1) and (4.2) allowing also for asymmetries to both signs and orders of magnitude of news, as in equations (4.3) and (4.4).
Differently from the results of the entire period, sub 1) and 2) shown in Tab. 4.2, and from previous empirical studies on news 81 , we obtained a quite surprising finding, conflicting with the rational/efficient market hypothesis: stale news has predictive power and affects the returns of the exchange rate.
82
One hypothesis to justify this «anomaly» of the efficiency market hypothesis is of statistical order and nature. It could result from a mis-specification of the dynamics of the «rational model» exchange rate equation. However, if the omitted factors of the dynamics cannot be identified, this hypothesis is not testable. Moreover, the fact that the anomaly does not show over the entire sample period seems to suggest that the mis-specified equation is actually the one that disregards the breaks. This is consistent with the history of the first years of existence of the Euro and with a common opinion of many traders: the foreign exchange market goes through various and different phases where traders focus on different market-moving factors. We thus have, historically, the big movers of the eighties, the weekly money stock announcements, after the regime change in monetary policy in the US in the early eighties, and the US trade balance, after the big revaluation of the Dollar in the mid-eighties. In the late nineties, inside our sample period, the frequency of "changing idiosyncrasies" by financial markets increases considerably. We could econometrically isolate three, but the short-term "market fetishes" come about much more frequently 83 .
An alternative hypothesis for the anomaly can be formulated in terms of behavioral theory. We recognize that the findings of market inefficiency «anomaly» is neither a proof of agents' irrationality, nor a statistical evidence of behavioral hypotheses as postulated by the Prospect Theory. 84 Moreover, our goal here is not to focus on empirical tests of the over-reaction or underreaction hypothesis. However, we are interested in presenting and interpreting some empirical evidence that deserve attention because it represents a violation of the semi-strong form of the efficiency market hypothesis. Thus, although we do not claim that this violation is a proof that agents fail to revise their expectation according to Bayes' rule, nevertheless we will interpret these findings as an indication that when different regimes are taken into account, the model deviates from the pure rational/efficient market hypothesis, and that its implications do not longer hold.
In this spirit, we shall identify two main types of subsequent corrective reaction to past news: a reaction producing a reinforcing effect and a reaction producing a re-adjustment effect. The former effect is similar to the under-reaction effect of the behavioral economics literature, whilst the latter is similar to the over-reaction effect.
Over-reaction and under-reaction are well-established 81 Footnotes 2 and 3. 82 According to FAMA(1970) , the semi-strong form of the Efficiency Market Hypothesis (EMH) posits that it is not possible to earn a superior risk-adjusted return based on the knowledge of any publicly available information. Thus past news announcements cannot be used to predict returns. 83 See second paragraph. 84 TVERSKY-KAHNEMAN(1974) provided experimental psychological evidence that under uncertainty people fail to calculate risk rationally but value the comfort of herds and are far more frightened of losses than inspired by potential gains.
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behavioral principles, widely investigated and empirically tested in finance 85 . They have been used to explain price reversal or price trendiness following the initial impact of the news.
Here we prefer to use the term «reinforcing» (RE) and «re-adjustment» (RA) to typify the following subsequent reactions to stale news: a reinforcing effect is a subsequent action of the same sign as the initial impact of the news, whilst a re-adjustment effect is a corrective action having an opposite sign with respect to the initial impact of the news.
We can find many examples of RE and RA in the foreign exchange market. In this huge twobillion-dollar-a-day environment, each market interpretation and action by a single participant is critically dependent for its success on a sizable amount of similar actions by others. So typically some form of conformism (causing herd behavior in limiting cases) is the name of the game here.
RE can be observed more frequently in periods of extreme polarization in one direction, as in the first (Euro weakness) and third regime (Euro strength). In this case forex traders look for all sorts of "excuses" (trading decisions weak on analysis but dictated by the market sentiment of the moment) to justify their market positioning. Strong market signals and news -exerting sharply different effects in other moments -tend to be disregarded and the exchange rate is dominated by RE stimuli.
RA moves become more frequent near technical peaks, when the market is "over-stretched" -in the jargon of traders -and in the proximity of turning points. Here the forex community becomes more heterogeneous so that RE and RA episodes occur side by side. Our second regime has many episodes like this.
An additional justification to prefer terms such as RE and RA to over-reaction and under-reaction is dictated by our dealing with some «hybrid cases» of reaction to those lagged announcements and surprises coming from a different trading area. These cases are hybrid in this respect: the correction does not follow investors' own initial reaction, but rather it is a revision of other investors' interpretation of news, and it is based on traders' perception of someone else's beliefs. To our knowledge, these events do not constitute pure cases of either over-reaction or under-reaction hypotheses.
In section 4.4) we shall focus more in detail on the results on lagged news. Being so relevant to identify RE and RA patterns and being the latter so widespread in the recent history of the Euro, we can say that the number of relevant news and the typology of reaction to lagged (RE) and (RA) news depend on all the sample segmentations used in this paper: 1) on the area, 2) on the three regimes and 3) on the type of news (bad or good).
4.1) Estimation procedure
We run OLS estimates of all equations testing each equation in each regime for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The results of the tests are reported in Tables 4.3 -4.8. We found two cases, period one and period two for the European trading zones, of violation of the basic OLS hypotheses. For all types of equations -from pure rational./efficient model to the final specification with lagged news -we found statistical evidence of heteroskedasticity (period one Europe, Tab. 4.3) and serial correlation (period two Europe, Tab. 4.4). We corrected the violation of the null hypothesis by using Robust Errors estimators (with 4 lags in the case of serial correlation).
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For the final specification of the equations (equation 5 in the tables for the the three regimes), we computed standardized coefficients, so as to be able to compare coefficients directly and rank the contribution of each explanatory variable to the explanation of the dependent variable.
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Looking at Tables 4.3 -4.8, the general estimation strategy in the three sub-samples has been that of moving from the Rational Model of equations 1 and 2 to the two dynamic specifications in equations 3 and 4 followed by a reduction from the latter two equations to the Final Model (equation 5). As we mentioned earlier, we try to test the violations to the EMH (going from equations 1-2 to 3-4), we then clean up all the non-significant variables, taking also into account possible distortions caused by multicollinearity.
4.2) General Results
In analyzing the results we shall proceed as follows: first we shall compare and contrast similarities and differences across trading areas, within each regime and through time in (4.2.1); secondly we shall focus on asymmetric responses to news, in (4.2.2). Lastly, we shall concentrate more specifically on interpreting lagged news, in 4.2.3. For each regime and each trading area, we shall discuss the results by focusing on the signs of coefficients, relative contribution of variables and on the presence of asymmetric reactions to good-bad news and to large-small news.
4.2.1) Areas, Regimes and Asymmetries
Summarizing very briefly some dynamic developments along areas and regimes, we find: 1) There is progressively stronger reaction to previous area's variations of the exchange rate in the European trading zone (coefficient 2 in Tables 4.3 -4.5). 2) Long-term interest rates, as proxies of the direction of monetary policies, do not exert any particularly relevant role (coefficients 3 and 4 in all equations). This fact is quite evident in period one (Tabs. 4.3, for ETZ, and 4.6, for ATZ) and three (Tabs. 4.5, for ETZ, and 4.8, for ATZ), when the final cumulative effect of the two areas to long term rates is almost zero.
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This could be due to polarization of €-$ in these periods. Only in regime two, which corresponds to a period of more uncertainty, and only for the American market -whose economy is scanned closely to evaluate the effects of 9/11 -do long term rates provide some information and «guidance» over the possible future course of events. 3) For US trading, fundamentals -especially the Dow Jones -have always played a substantial role in affecting the exchange rate, ranking first among all variables in terms of the size of the impact coefficient (coefficients 2 -7 in Tabs. 4.6 -4.8). 4) In the European trading area, news surprises dominate fundamentals. Among all news, the unscheduled variables have a prominent role (Tabs. 4.3 -4.5). 5) In ATZ European macroeconomic news (only the German IFO, in our case) are never significant (Tabs. 4.6 -4.8). 6) European traders become progressively less and less responsive to their area's macroeconomic news and more reactive to American macroeconomic news (Tabs 4.6 -4.8). 86 The Robusterrors procedure to correct heteroskedasticity or serial correlation, applies OLS and then corrects the estimated covariance matrix under more complex assumptions on the residuals. See HAYASHI (2000) for more technical details. 87 See PINDYCK-RUBINFELD(1997) page 98 on standardized coefficients. 88 The effects in the areas cancel each other out.
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In period one, surprises that reinforce the tendency of a weak Euro have stronger effects than news «against the trend»in Europe (Tab. 4.3, equation 5, standardized coefficients 89 5,6). However, large surprises generate corrective actions, as they could be interpreted as triggers that could invert the rising trend of the dollar (same, coefficients 7,8).
Two interesting findings are worth noticing: firstly, long-term interest rates exert mild effects. Moreover, in Europe, the negative sign of the European rates suggests that the price effect could dominate the interest rate effect: thus bearish expectations (because of slow growth) on long-term interest rates exerted a positive effect on the Euro (same, coefficients 3,4) . However, if we considered the cumulative coefficient (American and European reaction to European rates), this variable has the expected positive sign.
The second interesting finding is the subsequent reaction to oral intervention of the European Central Bank in favor of the Euro that reduces the initial impact effect (Tab. 4.3, equation 5, coefficients 14, 15) . This correction could be interpreted as the market «susceptibility» to the lack of transparency and of propriety of announcements of the European Central Bank (see paragraph 3).
Period two is a period of relative stability for the Dollar at a high level. During this regime, reactions to surprises are «mixed» shifting between sentiments of possibly an even stronger dollar, dollar stability, or inversion of dollar path. The significant effects of American monetary policy confirm investors' uncertainty about future path of the dollar, and suggest that monetary policy becomes more «informative» under an uncertainty climate than under a polarized one.
The third regime is characterized by a generalized sentiment of strengthening of the Euro. Monetary policy does not play the canonical theoretical role on the exchange rate. The Euro appreciates in spite of significant reduction of long-term interest rates.
If we consider the cumulative effects of the areas to TUSB, then American monetary policy has the expected correct sign but it exerts very weak effects, indicating that this variable is almost irrelevant. This is understandable under the extreme polarization of this period.
4.2.2) Lagged News: Geographic Factors
It is interesting to notice ) that approximately the two-thirds of the total lagged news for the three periods, are concentrated in the European trading area, implying that there is a different «geographic» attitude of investors and market traders in interpreting news. This result parallels those highlighted in paragraph 2 on the reason why the number of unscheduled news events is much higher in ETZ than ATZ: ETZ is a longer lasting time zone frequently operating in thinner market conditions than ATZ; ETZ is full of "disclosing activity" by European policy makers generally in sharp disagreement over the "right" value for the Euro. No surprise that in Europe traders must use "tea leaves" to a greater extent than in ATZ, where scheduled news on the largest economy in the world offers much more reliable guidelines than elsewhere.
This idea is confirmed when we look at the «geographic» distribution and type of stale news. In the American area half of the total lagged news is represented by scheduled news, none of them from the European area. The other half is represented by unscheduled news and only one-third reacted to European news. Thus overall, in the American trading area, investors and traders correct mainly American news. This finding is consistent with the fact that relevant news in the American zones is overwhelmingly American. Of all the 34 news, current and past, relevant to the American trading area under all regimes, only two (approximately 6%) are reactions to stale European news. 4.2.3) Lagged News and Corrective Actions: Reinforcing and Re-adjusting As explained earlier, in our equations lagged news, when statistically relevant, can generate two types of corrective actions: a reinforcing reaction, (RE) or a re-adjustment (RA).
Moreover, in our case the mapping of different reactions must also take into account the fact that investors of one area can react to news of another area.
Overall, during the entire sample period, out of 31 lagged news items, we can find 9 cases of reinforcing movement (five of them concentrated in period when the Iraq crisis is at its climax) and 21 cases of re-adjustments (fifteen in the last two periods when doubts grow overtime over the commitment by the US Authorities to a "strong Dollar" policy).
Two results further underline the heterogeneity between ETZ and ATZ trading patterns. Firstly, the number of re-adjustment actions in the European trading area falls progressively from period one to period three, whilst the opposite occurs for the American area, even though the underlying scenario is the same for both areas. In the last regime, the cases of American re-adjustments outnumber the European ones. Secondly, European traders re-adjust progressively less often to American news, in going from period one to period three. American traders re-adjust progressively more often to their own previous action.
4.3) Main Findings
We summarize here the main results of our analysis in this Section 90 1. Lagged news variables have predictive power and affect the returns of the exchange rate once we move from estimation over the entire period to sub-periods. This is a surprising result conflicting with the rational/efficient market hypothesis. The fact that this anomaly does not show over the entire sample period seems to suggest that this is due precisely to a 90 We investigated further the occurrence of regime switches by modeling the probability of the switches with a Probit model. The results are contained in CAGLIESI-TIVEGNA (2005). Here we summarize the main findings that reinforce the results obtained in this paper.
• For both ETZ and ATZ, unscheduled news has a predominant role in affecting the degree of confidence of the Euro and hence the probability of regime switches. The only scheduled news affecting the probability of the switch -in both areas . is the US Non-farm payroll.
• The only fundamentals exerting any effects in ATZ are the past value of the Dow Jones and the European longterm interest rates. Likewise in Europe, we found the occurrence of a «polarization» phenomenon and the dominance of the price effect (bearish traders).
• Differently from ETZ traders, ATZ traders seem to have a very consistent pattern towards asymmetries: they believe in the mighty Greenback and so they are really stricken only by Euro positive (thus Dollar negative) unscheduled surprises. As for the scheduled news, they are really moved only by positive surprise on the US Nonfarm payroll.
• The unscheduled news events which exert the highest contribution to regime switches relevant unscheduled surprises are DUSP, WUSP and WEUP. Indeed the last variable represents the only European news in the USA trading area.
• In both ETZ and ATZ, past information (lagged news) matter to «create» a perception of the strength or weakness of the Euro. In particular, we found a more articulated dynamics, with news exerting effects immediately and for six consecutive lags.
disregard of the breaks. This is consistent with recent history of the Euro and with the common observation that the forex market goes through various phases where traders focus on different market-moving factors. 2. The results of our estimates once looked at jointly with the recent history of the €-$ market in Section 3 indicate that a deeper grasp of its fluctuations can came from the behavioral finance toolkit. We adapted the over-under reaction schemes to our results, finding many episodes of reinforcing and re-adjusting responses of the exchange rate to news. 3. The estimates of the second coefficient of Tabs. 4.3 -4.8 show a very important explanatory power of the log variation of the exchange rate in the previous trading area indicating a mean reversion during the global trading day. 4. Interest rates exert a significant, but weak, effect. 5. The movements of the US stock market in ATZ play a substantial role in the exchange rate fluctuations. 6. In the European trading area unscheduled news surprises determine €-$ movements much more than fundamentals and scheduled news. 7. There is a remarkable geographic diversification in the distribution between ETZ and ATZ of total lagged news for the three periods. Two thirds of them are concentrated in the European trading area -many of them originating from ATZ -one third in ATZ. When we look into this third, we see that US investors and traders correct mainly American news. This finding is consistent with the fact that relevant news in the American zones is overwhelmingly American. 8. We find evidence of heterogeneity in trading patterns between ETZ and ATZ, as the number of re-adjustment actions in the European trading area falls progressively from period one to period three, whilst the opposite occurs for the American area, even though the underlying scenario is the same for both areas.
.) Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we studied the determinants of the €-$ exchange rate, since its inception in 1999, using the news approach to exchange rate modeling and some behavioral finance categories in the interpretation of our results. A twice-daily frequency of estimation was chosen dividing the global trading day into an European Time Zone, ETZ (including also Asian trading), and an American Time Zone, ATZ.
A new typology of news variables, unscheduled news, was employed, together with the traditional scheduled macroeconomic news. These news events, consisting of policy statements, market events, market beliefs, terror-related events (described with greater detail in the second Section), turned out to be the main determinants of €-$ movements.
The econometric estimation was carried out over the entire period of Euro existence till April 9, 2004. Coefficient stability tests suggested to divide this time span into three sub-periods roughly corresponding to the first Euro-weakening period, until December 2000, to the subsequent period of fluctuation over a flat trend, until the Summer of 2002, to the third period of the appreciating Euro.
Econometric estimates were supported by a detailed history of the period, which corroborated the above partition, and was also useful in two other respects. They show the variety of non-economic and non-financial factors affecting exchange rates (all collected in the unscheduled news vector) and visualize many examples of unscheduled news in their natural environment.
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The main finding of our analysis is the rejection of the semi-strong EMH, once we move from the estimation over the entire sample of our model of €-$ to the three sub-periods. Here we find many lagged news variables to be significant, contrary to what EMH posits.
The distribution of lagged news across time zones (ETZ and ATZ) and among the three subperiods, or regimes, indicates a substantial heterogeneity in the way news items are decoded by market participants. ETZ equations contain a higher proportion of lagged news, a good part of them originating in ATZ. Exchange rate in this latter zone reacts almost exclusively to American news, contemporaneous and lagged, indicating that this zone influences the rest of the world but it is not affected by it.
Scheduled news events play a much bigger role in ATZ than in ETZ, especially the creation of new jobs in the US (the Non-farm Payroll). Exchange rate dynamics in ETZ are determined mostly by unscheduled news.
This paper is part of an ongoing research activity on news modeling of exchange rates and on the use of these models to build trading rules in the foreign exchange market. News on $-¥, £-$ and €-£ have been collected; so the same line of research carried out in this paper will be applied in the near future to these exchange rate pairs. 
